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Recent Decisions
under this rule, in both situations, the defendant's negligence rests
upon his engaging in conduct which created an unreasonable risk of
"bodily harm"; a reasonable man under the circumstances would have
recognized the risk and refrained from such conduct. The defendant
who chooses to engage the risk is liable to the injured plaintiff for all
"objectively ascertainable" personal injuries flowing from the conduct.
Frank M. McClellan

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-PLEA BARGAINING-The

Supreme Court of

Pennsylvania has held that any participation by a trial judge in the
plea bargaining process prior to trial is forbidden.
Commonwealth v. Evans, 434 Pa. 52, 252 A.2d 689 (1969).
Petitioner was charged with five crimes on which indictments had been
returned against him-one count of assault and battery and four counts
of aggravated robbery. Before trial, petitioner's lawyer met with the
prosecuting attorney and the trial judge in two side bar conferences and
in the judge's chambers. Following these meetings, the three parties
came to an agreement as to concurrent sentences on the five indictments. Petitioner agreed to plead guilty to all counts in exchange
for concurrent sentences of one to five years. All five counts resulted
from a single series of events involving five victims.
After he was sentenced, petitioner filed a petition under the Pennsylvania Post Conviction Hearing Act' alleging that his earlier plea
had been involuntary because of the trial judge's participation in the
plea bargaining process. The petition was dismissed by the Court of
Quarter Sessions of Philadelphia County. The Superior Court affirmed
the dismissal and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted allocatur
to review the decision.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reached the conclusion that a procedure which includes the trial judge in the plea bargaining process
"is not consistent with due process and that a plea entered on the basis
19, § 1180 (1970).
1. PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
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of a sentencing agreement in which the judge participates cannot be
'2
considered voluntary."
In reaching its conclusion, the court was not interested in and no
inquiry was directed to the exact activity of the trial in the instant
case. There was no indication that the judge made any threats to the
defendant regarding imposition of the maximum sentence if defendant
would decide to go through with the trial and be found guilty, as was
the case in Euziere v. United States;8 nor did he, as the judge did in
the case of United States v. Tateo,4 raise a threat of consecutive sentences on several counts unless defendant pleaded guilty. Such statements by the trial judges are generally found to be coercive and convictions based on those pleas reversed. On the other hand, there is no
indication that the trial judge's activities greatly benefited petitioner
and enabled him to obtain a substantially lighter sentence than he
would most probably have received following a trial, as was the finding
of the court in Kimbrough v. United States,5 nor, as in United States
ex. rel. McGrath v. LaVallee,6 was there a finding that the trial
judge's statements were "merely a fair description of the consequences
attendant upon prisoner's choice of plea ....-7 In this case there was
no discussion at all of what part the trial judge took in the bargaining.
The mere presence of the trial judge during the conferences between
defense and prosecuting attorneys was considered sufficient to render
defendant's plea involuntary.
In reaching its conclusion, the court relied principally on Commonwealth ex rel Kerekes v. Maroney,8 the American Bar Association
Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, and United States
ex. rel. Elksnis v. Gilligan.9 It is submitted that the cited cases decidedly
do not support the decision in Evans.
"First," the Court reasoned,
the defendant can receive the impression from the trial judge's
participation in the plea discussions that he would not receive
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
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a fair trial if he went to trial before the same judge. Second, if the
judge takes part in the pre-plea discussion, he may not be able to
judge objectively the voluntariness of the plea when it is entered.
Finally, the defendant may feel that the risk of not going along
with the disposition which is apparently desired by the judge is so
great that he ought to plead guilty despite an alternative desire.' 0
Quoting Elksnis, the Court noted that,
The unequal positions of the judge and the accused, one with the
power to commit to prison, and the other deeply concerned to
avoid prison, at once raise a question of fundamental fairness.
When a judge becomes a participant in plea bargaining process
he brings to bear the full force and majesty of his office. His awesome power to impose a substantially longer or even maximum sentence in excess of that proposed is present whether referred to or
not. A defendant needs no reminder that if he rejects the proposal,
stands on his right to trial and is convicted, he faces a significantly
longer sentence."
The Court, however, did qualify its decision. Referring to the ABA
Minimum Standards, the Court stated that while the judge's participation in the plea-bargaining process before an agreement has been
reached between prosecution and defense would be precluded, the
standards clearly indicate that the judge may be informed of the
final bargain once it has been reached and before the guilty plea
is formally offered.. . . This limited action by the trial judge is

allowed on the theory that a greater degree of certainty that the
bargain
will be accepted is necessary for the operation of the sys12
tem.

The court emphasized that the judge becomes involved only after
the participants have reached agreement. At that time, the court said,
the trial judge may
agreement and the
tender of the plea.
torney and defense
posed disposition?3

permit the disclosure to him of the tentative
reasons therefore in advance of the time for
He may then indicate to the prosecuting atcounsel whether he will concur in the pro-

The sole dissent, by Chief Justice Bell, is a general statement of sup10.
11.
12.
13.

434 Pa. at 55, 252 A.2d at 691.
256 F. Supp. at 254.
434 Pa. at 56, 252 A.2d at 692.
Id.
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port for the plea bargaining system. The inference to be drawn from
it is that the majority opinion is a threat to the very existence of that
system. The complete removal of the judge from the plea bargaining
process would make his acceptance of the bargain after tendering of
the plea too risky for most defendants to chance and if this were the
case, Chief Justice Bell's fear would be justified. Permitting the judge
to learn of the agreement after it has been reached, but before the plea,
on the other hand, while slightly reducing the probability of the judge's
accepting the bargain, still gives to the defendant the opportunity to
maintain his plea in tentative status while he learns of the judge's
reaction. In this light, a statement of general support for the plea bargaining system is actually unresponsive to the majority position.
The Pennsylvania law on this narrow subject is sparse, a condition
which appears to exist throughout the country. The authority consists
primarily of three cases, the Kerekes case, 1 4 which did not even involve
judicial participation, Commonwealth v. Senauskas,15 and Commonwealth v. Scoleri.16 These two latter cases do not provide reason for the
court's action in Evans. There is no hint in either of these cases that
an Evans decision would be forthcoming. The Senauskas case involved
a question of judicial misconduct-a judge allegedly committing
himself to a particular lenient sentence during a conference from
which the prosecution was absent. The Scoleri case involved misconduct by a judge and by the defense attorney. Thus, the two cases in
Pennsylvania which deal directly with judicial participation in plea
bargaining involve questions of judicial or professional misconduct,
and not, significantly, questions of the violation of defendant's due
I
process.
Evans appears to represent a major departure from the general approach taken in other jurisdictions toward the problem of judicial
participation in plea-bargaining. Participation by the trial judge in
pre-plea bargaining had been considered simply one factor to take
into consideration in determining when a voluntary and knowing plea
had been made. Since the Evans court relies on a federal case for its
basic premise, a comparison to the federal law is appropriate. Whereas
the Evans court states flatly that a judge who participates in pleabargaining cannot thereafter weigh the voluntariness of the plea, the
14.
15.
16.
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federal courts have been prone to treat each case individually, assessing the effect in each instance of the trial court's participation on the
defendant.
In the most flagrant cases, if the judge, intentionally or otherwise,
has provided the defendant with erroneous information which may
have played a part in defendant's decision to plead, the plea-based
conviction will be voided, usually on the grounds that the plea was
not knowingly and intelligently entered. 17
In another type of case which arises frequently, the trial court,
prosecution and defense will reach an agreement on the basis of which
the trial judge will make a commitment as to the sentence, which commitment is later broken. Such, in fact, was the situation in Elksnis,18
where petitioner, facing deportation if convicted a second time for a
felony, agreed to plead guilty in exchange for the judge's promise not
to impose sentence in excess of 10 years. The judge claimed that he had
acted on the assumption that petitioner was a first felony offender.
When the district attorney filed an information charging petitioner as
a second felony offender, the judge imposed a sentence of 17/ to
35 years. The court said,
The fact that a promise which induced a guilty plea was subsequently kept does not establish that the plea was voluntary.
Whether it was must be decided in the light of events at the time
of its entry. The issue does not lend itself to precise mathematical
determination; its resolution is one of fact which "involves an
evaluation of psychological factors and elements that may be reasonably calculated to influence the human mind." A crucial
question here is the impact, if any, of the judge's promise upon
the defendant. The fact that the promise may not have been
deliberately designed or intended to induce the defendant to plead
guilty is not material-the question is did it have that impact. 19
The Evans court relied heavily on the Elksnis case as supporting the
prohibition of participation by the trial judge in plea bargaining prior
to the offering of the plea. A careful reading of Elksnis, however, will
indicate that it does not stand for that proposition at all; and if it does
stand for that proposition, the case has been emasculated by United
States ex rel Rosa v. Follette,20 a case decided by the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals two years after Elksnis. In order to understand the
17. Pilkington v. U.S., 315 F.2d 204 (4th Cir. 1963).
18. 256 F. Supp. 244 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
19. Id. at 253.
20. 395 F.2d 721 (1968).
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Elksnis case, it is necessary to distinguish two fact situations: the first
is that in which the acquiescence of the defendant is induced by a
promise of the trial judge; the second is where the trial judge, following
defendant's acquiescence to an agreement with the prosecution and
prior to the plea, promises that he will impose a specific sentence. The
Elksnis case is limited to the first situation and stands only for the
proposition that a plea induced by a promise of the trial judge is not a
voluntary plea. If the case stands for that, and no more, it is representative of the law on the subject in substantially all 50 states and federal
courts. If, however, it stands for the proposition that any participation
in plea-bargaining by the judge prior to the entering of the plea is
prohibited, then it is not good law. The Rosa court stated that
[I]n any event, we would be hesitant to hold that the mere participation of the trial judge in any aspect of plea negotiation,-no
matter how tangential and unlikely to be coercive-necessarily
renders a plea of guilty involuntary ....

The issue ultimately to

be resolved is not so much who participated in the plea discussions, but whether the defendant's decision to plead guilty was
coerced or otherwise invalid. And that determination can be made
only after a careful examination of the facts in each particular
case. 21
The Rosa court continued:
[W]hile some of the dicta in Elksnis lends support of Rosa's position (that participation by the trial judge per se in plea-bargaining makes the plea involuntary), that case was correctly decided
on its facts. Two essential elements present in Elksnis are missing
here: the trial court conferred informally with Elksnis and promised a specific term if he would change his plea from not guilty
of murder in the second degree to guilty of manslaughter in the
first degree; and, the court imposed a longer imprisonment than
the court
had been promised because after the plea was changed
22
learned that Elksnis was a second felony offender.
Not only did the Rosa court distinguish Elksnis, but it further stated
that "[W]hile we certainly adhere to the proposition that a trial
judge must always act with full awareness of the awesome power of
his office, this court has held that the participation of the trial judge
'
in plea discussions does not in itself render the plea involuntary. "23
21. Id. at 725.
22. Id.
23. Id.
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The Rosa court cited United States ex. rel. McGrath v. LaVallee,24
where the court, while refusing petitioner's request for a reversal, had
granted a hearing to determine the accuracy of a transcript made of the
plea bargaining discussion which had included the judge. Petitioner
claimed that his plea was the product of deceit, promise or threat. His
plea was found to have been voluntary and that decision was affirmed.
In an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, Judge
Friendly made the following observation on the attitude of the court:
Perhaps in order to avoid a later claim of coercion and consequent denial of due process, a judge would be wiser to abstain
from any conversation about a guilty plea with a criminal defendant awaiting trial before him-even when, as here, the judge is
acting in what he soundly considers the defendant's best interest
and in line with the recommendation of experienced defense
counsel, and the result of the abstention is likely to be a heavier
sentence for the defendant whose rights the due process clause
aims to protect. However, no one contends that such a conversation by a judge is, per se, a denial of due
process; decision turns
25
on what was said and its probable effect.
The appearance of Commonwealth ex. rel. Kerekes v. Maroney26
in the majority opinion is not much more support for the Court. Not
only did the Kerekes court uphold the validity of the plea, but it
was a plea derived from discussions to which the trial judge was not
a party. In addition, the "warning" which the Evans court speaks of as
having been stated in Kerekes consisted of a quotation from the McGrath case, a case which, we have seen, does not support the Evans
court's refusal to examine the specific facts surrounding the trial judge's
participation in that case. Moreover, the Kerekes Court stated:
...our cases have not set forth a fixed procedure for determining
the validity of a guilty plea; rather we have held that this is a
factual issue which must be resolved on a case by case basis according to the defendant's actual understanding of his plea and his
willingness to enter it.27
Whether or not the Evans case will result in substantial practical
changes in the conduct of the plea-bargaining process has yet to be
24. 319 F.2d 308 (2d Cir. 1963); cert. denied, 369 U.S. 808 (1962).
25. Id. at 315. See Kimbrough v. United States, 226 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1955), for a
case in which the court held that defendant had benefited from the trial judge's participation in the plea bargaining process.
26. 423 Pa. 337, 223 A.2d 699 (1966).
27. Id. at 343, 223 A.2d at 705.
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seen. The practice in the criminal courts of Philadelphia has been for
counsel to appear before the calendar judge in the afternoon preceding
trial. The calendar judge often invites counsel to confer with each
other and discuss the possibility of a plea with them. With counsel's
consent, the judge hears a summary of evidence presented by each and
the status of their negotiations. He often will then indicate what he
would consider to be an appropriate disposition and sentence. If counsel and the defendant agree, the case is heard by the calendar judge;
but if they do not agree, it is assigned for trial before another judge.
If the discussion with counsel by the trial judge can be considered
the prohibited "participation," it is unclear exactly how it is more
coercive on defendant than the procedure outlined in Evans. In addition, it is equally unclear how the judge, at this point, can, once all the
evidence has been explained to him and he indicates his acceptance of
the plea, any less judge its voluntariness with objectivity.
It is, of course, foolish to believe that the judge can be excluded fromthe plea bargaining process prior to the time the plea is entered. If
Evans required such exclusion, plea bargaining would without doubt
end in Pennsylvania. Prior to the entering of a plea of guilty, an accused must have assurance that the bargain will be accepted by the
judge. Accused persons cannot be expected to bind themselves to guilt
unless the bargains on which they depend are upheld.
In addition, the plea must be entered by the accused voluntarily and
with understanding. And an accused must in fact be guilty. The judge
may not, under present law, accept a plea of guilty from an accused who
enters a bargain although believing himself to be innocent. Too, the
state has an interest which must be protected against "over-cooperative"
prosecutors.
All of the above considerations require that the judge be informed
of the facts of the case and the arguments on both sides sometime
prior to the entering of the plea by the accused. If Evans is followed,
the agreement will be arrived at through consultation only between
defense and prosecution. The judge will then hear the recommendation of the prosecution and, in determining the justification for the
recommendation and its acceptability, will be informed of the facts of
the case. If he finds no undue compromise of the state's interest, he
should then inquire of the defendant to determine the voluntariness
and understanding with which the plea is entered. During the inquiry
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the judge should explain to the defendant the terms of the bargain,
and should extract from him not merely a plea of guilty, but the
equivalent of an in-court, on the record confession. The plea may then
be accepted and sentence according to the bargains imposed.
If the plea is not accepted, however, Evans may require that the case
be removed to another judge for trial, and it is this requirement, not
the exclusion of the judge from the actual bargaining, which is likely
to have a real and practical effect in terms of criminal court process,
and which rises numerous questions.
If, following rejection of the bargain and before the trial, defense
and prosecution reach another agreement, must it be presented to the
same judge, or should it be presented to a second judge? If the first
judge, is that judge not participating in the bargaining process if he rejects several agreements in a row, finally accepting one more to his
liking? May a rejected agreement be presented to the second judge for
acceptance? May the second judge be informed of the rejected first
agreement and its contents? In rejecting the bargain, may the judge
point out strategies and considerations which the prosecution may
have overlooked in assessing the potential of the case? May he cite overlooked defenses? May he even request any information concerning defenses in the presence of the prosecution? Must the contents of the
agreement and the decision to accept or reject it be recorded.
If plea bargaining is to be an accepted practice, can rejection of a
bargain and plea even constitute an abuse of discretion by the hearing
judge? At what point is the defendant bound by the plea? Should defendant be permitted to withdraw the plea after the judge has heard
all the facts but before he has formally accepted the plea? If the first
judge is permitted to explain the reason for his refusal to accept the
bargain, and the defense and prosecution enter a second agreement on
the basis of that explanation, has the judge "participated" in the plea
bargaining in violation of Evans? How many judges can the parties
go through if there is more than one rejection?
Resourceful lawyers and desparate defendants will eventually require
the court to answer these and other questions. Evans, therefore, may
have created more problems than it solved. That is not, however, the
test of a bad decision. Conceptually, Evans is undoubtedly correct in
placing the judge in a position of neutrality to protect the rights of
both the state and defendant. What Evans will do, however, is not to
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simply postpone the judge's entrance on stage; it will require the treatment of plea bargaining as an integral part of the criminal justice system, complete with a body of specific and perhaps complicated court
rules and delineated procedures.
Stanley M. Stein
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